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STATE1IENT OF THE CASE 
. (The numbers in parentheses refer to pages in the 
Record). 
The trial court, upon return of a jury verdict in favor 
of plaintiff, granted defendant's 1\fotion for a Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and plaintiff prosecutes this 
appeal from the judgment of no cause _of action. 
On December 5, 1949, while plaintiff was riding in a 
truck being driven by his business partner, he was injured 
as a result of a collision which occurred between said 
truck and an automobile being driven by defendant at the 
intersection of W P~t Temple and 33rd South Streets, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
The plaintiff admits that the negligence, if any, of the 
driver of the truck may be imputed to plaintiff-passen-
ger. 
Thirty-third South Street is a two-lane highway lo-
cated in Salt Lake County extending in an easterly and 
westerly direction and is intersected by West Temple 
Street, which extends in a northerly and southerly direc-
tion. On the date of the accident the driver of plaintiff'~ 
vehicle was driving in an easterly direction along Thirty-
third South Street (R. 38) at a speed of approximately 
15 to 20 miles per hour (R. 40). At a distance approxi-
matPly 100 feet wP~t of the intersection of \YP:-;t Temple 
~trePt he extended his arm in a horizontal position, indi-
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eating- a left-hand turn at the intersection. He maintained 
hi~ arrn in this position until he reached the center of the 
intersection when he was struck in the rear by the de-
fendant's Yehicle (R. -t-2). The driver of plaintiff's ve-
hicle te~tified that at the time of the impact the front of 
his Yehicle was near the yellow lines in the center of the 
two streets. He stated his vehicle came to rest at a point 
slightl~"" north of the property line on the north side of 
Thirty-third South Street and on the east half of West 
Temple Street. He testified that defendant's vehicle came 
to rest near the point of impact (R. 45). 
The defendant testified that he was proceeding east 
on Thirty-third South Street at a speed of from 45 to 50 
miles per hour (R. 74). When he was approximately 300 
feet from the intersection of West Temple Street he 
moved his vehicle into the opposite or westbound traffic 
lane for the purpose of passing three vehicles, of which 
plaintiff was then in the forward vehicle (R. 73). At this 
point the defendant estimated that plaintiff was about 50 
feet from the intersection (R. 7 4). The defendant then 
stated that when he was 100 feet from the intersection he 
became aware of plaintiff's intention to make a left-hand 
turn (R. 74), that he applied his brakes and skidded a dis-
tance of 76 feet, colliding with the rear of plaintiff's ve-
hicle (R. 77). The defendant placed the point of impact 
at 15 feet west of the center of the intersection and 3 feet 
north of the center line of Thirty-third South Street (R. 
67). 
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On cross examination plaintiff's driver testified: 
'' Q. Mr. Hayden, did you notice any cars behind you 
prior to the accident 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't notice two cars immediately behind 
you and the highway patrolman then 1 
A. No, sir. I seen one pull out beside me and went 
around me. 
Q. One went around you to the right 1 
A. On the right of me, yes. 
Q. Is that before you made your turn or after-
ward? 
A. Just as I was getting ready to make my turn 
(R. 48). 
"Q. Now, Mr. Hayden, tell me what you did before 
you made your turn that day? 
A. Well I held my left hand out to make a left hand 
turn. 
Q. You noticed the car going around your right 
at that time? 
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A. No sir, not right at the time. 
Q. vVhen you did you notice the car go around to 
the right of you 1 
A. Just before I got ready to make my turn. 
Q. Just before you got ready to make the turn 1 
A. I'd say about 20, maybe 20 feet back he went 
around me. 
* :I: * • 
'' Q. It did go around you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Before the impact? (R. 50). 
A. Yes. 
Q. And another car right behind it wasn't there~ 
A. No, sir never. seen no car or nothing in back of 
1ne only that one that went around me. 
Q. Did you see any car behind you at all before 
the time of the crash? 
A. No, sir. 
* * * * 
'' Q. Did you look in your rearview mirror 1 
A. No, sir I did not. 
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Q. You didn't~ 
A. I was watching in front of me. (R. 51)." 
Based upon the driver's failure to glance to the rear, 
the defendant, upon completion of plaintiff's case and 
prior to the case being submitted to the jury, moved the 
trial court for a directed verdict on the grounds that the 
driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
The trial court denied the motion and, in submitting the 
case to the jury, included the following instruction: 
"The driver of the truck has admitted by his 
testimony that he did not see the automobile of the 
defendant during its approach for passing at any 
time before the collision, and has admitted that he 
neither looked in his rear view mirror or glanced 
back to see if any automobile was approaching from 
the rear. If you find and believe from the evidPnrP 
that the ommission of the driver of the truck in the 
particular just mentioned was such an ommission as 
an ordinarily reasonable, prudent and cautious per-
son would not make under the same or similar cir-
cumstan<'Ps and that his failure in that regard is one 
of the proximate causes of the collision, then you 
cannot find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff anrl 
against the defendant." (R. 22). 
The jury then returned a verdict in favor of tlw 
plaintiff and against the dPfendant and assessed <lam-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
ages in the ~mn of $3,000.00. Based upon the same 
grounds a~ the directed verdirt, the defendant moved for 
a Judgment Notwithstanding the Y erdict and the trial 
court granted the motion. The trial court, in granting the 
n1otion, filed a Ineinorandum decision in which the court 
referred to 57-7-133, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, section 
(a), and particularly the portion that states a vehicle 
shall not be turned from a direct course or move right or 
left upon a roadway 'llnless and until such movement can 
he made with reasonable safety, and then stated: 
''I conclude that the language underlined placed 
a duty on the driver of the automobile about to make 
a left turn to take reasonable measures to inform 
himself of the presence of other automobiles. Ordin-
arily that duty can only be performed by glancing 
backward or looking in a rear view mirror to ascer-
tain if there is traffic approaching from the rear. The 
driver of the truck in this case did not do this and 
I conclude that his failure was negligence as a matter 
of law." (R. 89). 
The plaintiff contends that the reasoning and ap-
plication of the law to this case by the trial court was 
error and, based upon that error, this appeal is prose-
cuted. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED IDS RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE DRIVER OF PLAINTIFF'S VEIDCLE WAS CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLEGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AND THAT THIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE COLLISION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
The plaintiff strenuously asserts that the ruling of 
the trial court in granting the Judgment Notwithstand-
ing the Verdict was a refusal by the court to permit the 
jury to determine issues of fact and was a denial of plain-
tiff of his right to a trial h~' jury. 
When a litigant desires a jury to determine conflict-
ing and disputed issues of fact and when reasonable 
minds may differ upon the said issues, then the jury 
should be permitted to make its findings and the trial 
court should not invade this right. 
The plaintiff respectfully submits that in the case at 
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of plaintiff's Yehirle was a disputed question of fact and 
a jury question and that the trial court in granting the 
nwtion usurped the funrtion of the jury. 
This Court on numerous occasions has set forth rules 
to be followed by trial courts in determining whether or 
not a case should be subnlitted to the jury. See Shortino 
v. Salt Lake and U. R. Co., 52 Utah 476, 174 Pac. 860, and 
N eu·ton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 
Pac. 567. The most recent decision by this Court setting 
forth the duties and responsibilities of trial courts in 
taking matters from the jury is the case of Stickle v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., Utah, 251 P. 2d 867, wherein this 
Court stated at page 871: 
"In our democratic system, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is derived; from 
its initiation and creation to its final application and 
enforcement, the law is the expression of their will. 
The functioning of a cross-section of the citizenry as 
a jury is the method by which the people express this 
will in the application of law to controversies which 
arise under it. Both our constitutional and statutory 
provisions assure trial by jury to citizens of this 
state. 
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate 
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by 
presuming to determine questions of fact which liti-
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gants have a right to have passed upon by juries. 
Part of the merit of the jury system is its safeguard-
ing against such arbitrary power in the courts. To 
the great credit of the courts of this country, they 
have been extremely reluctant to infringe upon this 
right, and by leaving it unimpaired have kept the 
administration of justice close to the people. Of 
course, the rights of litigants should not be surren· 
dered to the arbitrary will of juries without regard 
to whether there is a violation of legal rights as a 
basis for recovery. The court does have a duty and 
a responsibility of supervisory control over the ac-
tion of juries which is just as essential to the proper 
administration of justice as the function of the jury 
itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the vital 
importance of the privilege of trial by jury in our 
our system of justice and deem it our duty to zeal-
ously protect and preserve it." 
We submit that under these authorities the refusal 
of the trial court to permit the determination of this case 
by the jury to stand constituted a violation of plaintiff's 
right to a trial by jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE DRIVER OF PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE WAS CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLEGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AND THAT THIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE COLLISION. 
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Plaintiff asserts that the finding of the jury on the 
issue of contributory negligence should have been per-
mitted to stand and the action of the trial court in set-
tinp; this finding aside and holding that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law con-
stituted reversible error. 
This Court in nu1nerous decisions has established 
standards for a trial court to follow before ruling that 
a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law and before taking such issue from the jury. 
In Martin v. Sterens, Utah, 243 P. 2d 747, this Court 
stated at page 749: 
"The question of contributory negligence is us-
'ltally for the jury and the court should be reluctant 
to take consideration of this question of fact from it. 
(Citing cases) * * * The right to trial by jury should 
be safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory 
negligence may be taken from the jury, the defend-
ant's burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence, and (b) that such 
negligence proximately contributed to cause his own 
injury, must be met, and established with such cer-
tainty that reasonable minds could not find to the 
contrary; conversely, if there is any reasonable basis, 
either because of lack of evidence, or from the evi-
dence and the fair inferences arising therefrom, tak 
en in the light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which 
reasonable minds may conclude that they are not 
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convinced by a preponderance of the evidence either 
(a) that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence or (b) that such negligence proximately con-
tributed to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled 
to have the question submitted to a jury." 
''If a driver has to drive his car under the as-
sumption that everyone else is apt to be negligent, 
the next step would be for him to conclude that he 
had better get off the streets entirely, or someone 
else is likely to hit him, and abandon the streets to 
those who are just willing to take chances. . . . As 
hereinabove suggested, we must avoid measuring the 
plaintiff's duty in charging him with negligence be-
caUBe he may have failed to anticipate and avert 
negligence on the part of the defendant." 
In Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, this Court an-
nounced standards to be followed by the courts in decid-
ing whether a jury or court should make a determination 
of the existence or nonexistence of negligence proxi-
mately causing the injuries complained about. The Court 
states on page 870 the following: 
''The authorities frequently state that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence is usually for the 
jury. And that this is so wherever the evidence is 
such that reasonable minds may differ as to its exist-
ence has been stated innumerable times, which is un· 
doubtedly correct. However, in view of the fact that 
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before the issue may be taken from the jury, the 
defendant has the burden of establishing plaintiff's 
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence it may 
be a bit more precise to state that the question of 
contributory negligence is for the jury whenever the 
evidence is such that jurors, acting fairly and reas-
onably, may say that they are not convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed 
to cause his ozcn injury. 
"It should be kept in mind that so far as the 
quantum of proof necessary to take the question of 
contributory negligence from the jury is concerned, 
the tests are the same as with respect to primary 
negligence. For instance, in a given case, there may 
be some evidence upon which a finding of negligence 
by the defendant could be based, yet the jury may re-
main in such a state of mind that they may fairly 
say that they are not convinced by preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant was negligent, 
and based upon such failure of proof may refuse to 
find a verdict against him. It would only be when 
the defendant's negligence had been established with 
such certainty that all reasonable men must conclude 
that he did not exercise reasonable care, that the 
court would rule as a matter of law that he was 
negligent and direct the jury to find a verdict 
against him; conversely, if evidence were such that 
reasonable 1nen may fairly say that they are not con-
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vinced fron1 a preponderance of the evidence that he 
was guilty of negligence, the court could not rule 
that he was negligent as a 1natter of law and take 
the case from the jury. 
''These principles apply in identical fashion to 
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence 
except that the defendant has the burden of proof. 
rrhat the evidence is such that the jury may find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiff failed to use due care for his own safety is not 
sufficient. The proof must establish his fail?tTe to do 
so with such cfrtaiuty that all rfasmwl>le miuds must 
so conclude before the court may rule as a matter of 
law that he is precluded from Tecorcry on that 
ground. The court should exercise cautiou and for-
bearance in considering taking questions of fact from 
the jury." 
Plaintiff contends that the action of the trial court 
is contrary to the express language of the Ill a rtin and 
Stickle cases. Plaintiff submits the verdict of thr jury 
demonstrates that the jury was not convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's driver wat' 
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to 
cause the accident. 
Plaintiff further submits that the trial court was in 
error for the reason ·that the evidence in this easP do<'s 
not P~tahli:·dl the negligence of the driver of plaintiff's 
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truck with such certainty that all reasonable minds must 
conclude that he was negligent and that this negligence 
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The driver 
testified when he was approximately 100 feet from the 
intersection he extended his arm in a horizontal posi-
tion to indicate a left-hand turn. (R. 42). The plaintiff 
contends that this act by the driver was an indication 
that he was conscious of his duty to warn vehicles to the 
rear of his intention to turn, and a reasonable man could 
well find that this was all that was needed to be done in 
the exercise of reasonable care, and further that areas-
onably prudent person would have done no more. The 
fact that a car passed the driver on the right just prior to 
the accident, (R. 50) would indicate to the driver that his 
signal had been observed and was observable to drivers 
in the rear and that it was not necessary for him to give 
any further warning or take any further precautions to 
make the movement in reasonable safety. The plaintiff 
submits that whether or not this driver had discharged 
his duty was a jury question. 
The plaintiff directs this Court's attention to the 
Stickle case. In that case the trial court directed a verdict 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff on the 
grounds that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law in failing to do something which 
the court felt should have been done. This Court, in re· 
versing the trial court's decision and holding that the 
matter should have been submitted to a jury, stated the 
following on page 871 : 
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''Reverting then to the inquiry pertinent here: 
Taking the evidence and the fair inferences there-
from in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
could reasonable minds remain in such a state that 
they could fairly say that they were not convinced 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he failed to 
use due care for his own safety. 
''In analyzing the evidence to answer this, there 
are four points which give support to plaintiff's 
contention : 
* * * * 
"and (d) further, he testified that he did make 
a test by pulling his weight on the band and it held 
him. 
* * * • 
"It appears to us that under the circumstances 
here shown, taking into consideration factors (a), 
(b), (e) and (d) as just set out reasonable men could 
well believe that the precaution plaintiff did tak<• was 
sufficient to meet the test of ordinary~ reasonable 
care for his own safety. Or more accurately~ that 
reasonable minds could fairly say that tlwy were not 
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he failed to use such degree of care. Aeeordinp;ly, 
the question of his contributory negligence should 
have been submitted to the jnry." 
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Lloyd r. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal. App.), 245 P. 
:.2d 583, a crossing case, held the issue of contributory 
negligence was for the jury. Upon a verdict for plaintiff 
and the denial of defendant's motion for Judgment Not-
withstanding the Verdict the defendant appealed. In af-
firming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
and in citing from another California case, the court 
stated the following on page 588: 
'' * * * \Vhere it is shown that plaintiff has exer-
cised some care, the question of whether or not the 
care actually exercised was due and sufficient will 
always be a matter for determination by the jury.'' 
We submit that under these authorities the action of 
the trial court in arbitrarily determining the question of 
due care was erroneous. 
Plaintiff further contends the trial court erred in 
holding the failure of the driver to glance to the rear was, 
as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the accident. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision stated (R. 
89): 
'' * * * had he glanced to the rear or looked in his 
rear view mirror at any time during the interval that 
he says he had his hand extended from the left win-
dow of the car he would have seen a highway patrol 
car proceeding at a speed three times that at which 
the truck was traveling and would have known that 
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he could not, as he did not, make the left turn with-
out being struck. I therefore conclude that his negli-
gence was a proximate cause of the collision and re-
sulting injury to the plaintiff.'' 
In construing the above language, there can be little 
wonder that the trial court reached the erroneous result 
that defendant was entitled to a judgn1ent when the court 
failed to take into consideration the fart that in order for 
the glance to the rear to be the proximate cause, the 
driver must have had an opportunity to prevent the ac-
cident. Again we submit the facts do not show any time 
at whiC'h the driver could have prevented the accident if 
he had glanced to the rear. The plaintiff further ass('rts 
that this consideration of the evidence suhstantiat('s 
plaintiff's claim because if the driver had glanced to the 
rear when he first extended his arm, the conduct of the 
defendant at that time cannot be said, as a matter of law, 
to have conveyed to the driver the intention of the de-
fendant to pass him in the intersection and interfere with 
his left-hand turn. 
Further, plaintiff contends that if the driver had 
glanced to the rear at the time the defendant moved his 
vehicle to the opposite lane of traffic, the driver at this 
moment was not granted an opportunity to prPYPnt the 
accident because the point of impact occurred within an 
interval of approxinmtely two seconds. 
Therefore, plaintiff submits the holding of the court 
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that the driver of plaintiff's vehicle was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law and that his negligence was 
a proximate cause of the accident was in error and con-
trary to the evidence. 
The following cases are similar to the case at bar 
and hold that the question of contributory negligence was 
a jury question : 
In the case of Turner v. McMillan, 140 Ore. 407, 14 
P. 2d 294. plaintiff and defendant were proceeding in 
the san1e direction, plaintiff being ahead of defendant. 
Plaintiff attempted to make a left-hand turn when de· 
fendant was attempting to pass plaintiff and an accident 
ensued. The case was submitted to the jury and, upon a 
verdict for plaintiff, defendant appealed. Defendant con-
tended the testimony of plaintiff indicated he was negli-
gent as a matter of law in his failure to give the proper 
signal and to observe the defendant 100 feet prior to his 
turn. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed on an in-
struction concerning damages, but with respect to the 
question of plaintiff being negligent as a matter of law, 
the court stated at page 295: 
'' * * * In support thereof, defendant argues that it 
affirmatively appears from plaintiff's testimony that 
plaintiff was negligent in failing to give the statu-
tory signal of intention to turn to his left, and in fail· 
ing to observe the whereabouts of defendant's car 
during the time that plaintiff was driving the last 100 
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feet before collision. \Ye think that there is evidence 
tending to show that as to defendant, plaintiff gave 
the statutory signal, namely, that of extending the 
arm horizontally. * * * \Ve think also that whether 
plaintiff was negligent in failing to observe the lo-
cation of defendant's car during the last hundred 
feet of his ill-fated ride is a matter to be submitted to 
the jury. The testimony tends to show that plaintiff 
was then traveling at the rate of ten miles an hour. 
At that rate 100 feet would be traYersed in approxi-
mately 6.82 seconds. We are unwilling to hold plain-
tiff guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, for his 
failure to look for defendant's car during that in-
terval or less than seven seconds. For these reason~ 
we conclude that no error was con1mitted by the 
learned trial judge in overruling the motions for 
nonsuit and directed verdict.'' * * * 
Another similar case is Burns v. Standring, et al., 
148 \Vash. 291, 268 Pac. 866. There plaintiff and defend-
ant were proceeding in the same direction and plaintiff 
was ahead of defendant from 75 to 300 feet. About 80 to 
90 feet before plaintiff made a left hand turn, he gave 
the proper arm signal and the defendant, in attempting 
to pass him, struck him. Upon a verdict for plaintiff, de-
fendant appealed, contending that plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence as a 1natter of law. In affirming the deci-
sion, the court stated as follows, page 867: 
"* * * The assignments of error are all based upon 
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the contention that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. The sole 
question presented is, Can the Court say as a matter 
of law that one driving a car and attempting to make 
a left turn off a highway after having given the 
proper signal is guilty of contributory negligence if 
he does not also look to the rear to discover whether 
or not there is an overtaking car attempting to 
pass~ * • • 
"We have many times held that where a person testi-
fies that he looked or failed to look and did not see 
an object which is plainly apparent, and thus moves 
into a dangerous zone, and an accident thereby re-
sults, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. But, in so far as this is applicable to 
drivers of automobiles, we think this applies only to 
objects in front of the driver and within his apparent 
range of vision. 
'' * * * We think the driver of a car has the right to 
asume that overtaking traffic attempting to pass will 
give a timely signal as required by the Automobile 
Code. We think all the authorities hold that it is the 
duty of the driver of an overtaking car to exercise 
care with respect to the forward car. (Citing cases). 
We now hold that it is the duty of the driver of an 
automobile to guard against traffic in front of him, 
to give timely warl\ing of his intention to leave the 
highway, and that· if, after having given timely 
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is injured by an overtaking car, the question of con-
trilmtory negligence is for the j1try." 
Plaintiff submits that considering the evidence in a 
light most favorable to him that a reasonable mind could 
conclude that the movement of the truck, if any, from a 
direct course or to the left was not a proximate ran~e of 
the collision. The driver of the true k testified that at the 
time of the collision the front end of the truck wa~ at or 
near the center line and that the rear portion of his truck 
was not over the center line of 33rd South Street (R. 39 
and 45). The testimony also disclosed that the front end 
of defendant'~ car hit the rear portion of plaintiff'~ truck 
( R. -t 1 and 44). From this the jury could conclude that 
the slowing down of the truck caused defendant to over-
take it so fast he was unable to stop in time to avoid the 
collision. The fact that defendant was approaching from 
the rear would not require the driver of the truck to con-
tinue easterl~T along the highway in order to PseapP be-
ing run down. ( \•rtainl~T he could slow down or stop. The 
junT could have found that before his movement to the 
left had become effective the collision had occurred be-
cause the defendant had run him down. In sn<'h event, it 
could not or cannot be said that any movement to the 
left was a substantial <·awmtive factor in <·ansillg· the <'Ol-
lision. 
CON( 1 1 .USTON 
Pnder the foregoing authoritiPs, it is apparent that 
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the trial court in granting defendant's motion for J udg-
ment Notwithstanding the Yerdict denied to plaintiff his 
right of trial by jury and also erroneously decided ques-
tions of fact that had been correctly submitted to a jury 
and decided by the jury adversely to the defendant. For 
these reasons, we submit that this Honorable Court 
should reverse the judgment of the trial court and rein-
state the judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND R. BRADY and 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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